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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
DAMAGES-PHYSICAL SUFFERING AND INCONVENIENCE RESULTING FROM
INJURIEs-THE USE OF MATHEMATICAL FORMULA DURING CLOSING ARGu-
MENT TO THE JURY AS A GUIDE FOR MEASURING THE PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PENSATOY AND ACTUAL DAMAGES--The Supreme Court of Missouri was
recently faced with the issue of whether or not it was error for the
plaintiff's counsel, during his closing argument to the jury, to write on
a large cardboard a statement of his client's claims concerning the
value of her particular injuries and then to ask the jury to adopt the
stated amounts in determining the plaintiff's damages.1 The case arose
when the plaintiff, who was allegedly in a safety zone waiting to board
an approaching streetcar, was struck by the defendant's automobile. A
verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of twenty
thousand dollars ($20,000.00). The defendant appealed from the judg-
ment, which was entered in accordance with the aforesaid verdict.
The defendant alleged, among other things,2 that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in allowing the plaintiff to write on a large
cardboard poster the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff,3 and
to further argue those amounts to the jury in his closing argument.
In affirming the judgment of the Trial Court, the Supreme Court
of Missouri held that although in the past it had been improper to in-
vite the jury to admeasure damages for pain on the basis of a mathe-
matical formula,4 it is not error for the plaintiff to engage in such con-
duct in his closing argument to the jury when the verdict is supported
by evidence in the record and the question as to the amount of dam-
ages is in issue.
It could be considered appropriate, at the outset, to note that the
problem posed in the aforesaid case is one which has never been decided
by the Illinois Supreme Court. However, the issue as to whether or
not it is prejudicial error for the plaintiff's counsel to submit to the
I Goldstein v. Fendelman, 336 S. W. (2d) 661 (Mo. 1960).
2 Defendant also alleged that the trial court erred in giving certain instructions
to the jury; that the trial court committed error in allowing the marital status
of the plaintiff to be known to the jury and that the verdict was grossly excessive.
3 The question of damages was at issue during the course of the trial and during
the plaintiff's closing argument, plaintiff's counsel wrote on a large cardboard
the amounts he asked the jury to award the plaintiff for each of 14 claimed
items totaling $77,735.00. Two items were medical and hospital bills, two were
loss of earnings, present and future. The others were claims for definite amounts
for specific injuries and results therefrom such as humiliation, suffering and pain.
4 Faught v. Washam, 365 Mo. 1021, 329 S. W. (2d) 588 (1959).
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jury in his closing argument a mathematical formula for the purpose of
measuring the amount of damages for pain and suffering, and to place
the same on a poster or blackboard for the jury to view is not unfa-
miliar in a great number of jurisdictions in the United States.5 In re-
cent years there has been a great amount of controversy over this issue.
How the Illinois Supreme Court will treat this problem when faced with
it is a matter of speculation and conjecture, however, the writer will
attempt to make a determination.
Only within the past few years have resourceful and ingenious counsel
developed the trial technique of appealing to the jury to follow a math-
ematical formula in admeasuring damages for pain and suffering. Cases
in Illinois have gone no further than to hold that counsel's mere argu-
mentative suggestion of a lump sum does not constitute reversible error 6
and no Illinois case discussing the so-called mathematical formula, and
presenting the same to the jury on a poster or blackboard has been found.
It would be appropriate at this time to discuss the pros and cons
on the issue7 as determined by other jurisdictions. The most outstand-
ing case supporting the theory of those jurisdictions which deny the use
of a mathematical formula and the presentation of the same to the
jury is Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company v. Virgil Braddock and
James M. Braddock.s
In the Seaboard Air Line case, supra, a jury returned a verdict in
the amount of two hundred forty eight thousand, four hundred thirty
nine dollars ($248,439.00), the precise amount sought by counsel based
on a mathematical formula, which was visually presented to the jury
on a placard during closing argument of counsel for the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court of Florida affirming the judgment without opinion, im-
5 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. (2d) 82 (Fla. App. 1959); Four County Electric
Power Assoc. v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. (2d) 144 (1954) (A chart which
listed pain and suffering at a rate of five dollars per day was used in the opening
statement by counsel and allowed by the court but expressly limited its opening
or closing statements) ; McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 588, 104 So. (2d) 315 (1958) ;
Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N. W. (2d) 30 (1956)
(Allowed the use of a mathematical formula for illustrative purposes and not as
a yardstick to test the reasonableness of the amount sought to be recovered);
Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. (2d) 4 (1956) ; Botta v. Brunner, 26 N. J. 82,
138 A. (2d) 713 (1958) ; Stassun v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 A. 111 (1936) ; Cooley
v. Crispino, 21 Conn. Super. 150, 147 A. (2d) 497 (1958) ; Henne v. Balick, 51 Del.
369, 146 A. (2d) 394 (1958) ; Wuth v. U. S., 161 F. Supp. 661 (E. D. Vir. 1958)
Warren Petroleum Co. v. Pyeatt, 275 S. W. (2d) 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
6 Graham v. Mattoon City Railroad Co., 234 Ill. 483, 84 N. 1). 1070 (1908).
7 Admeasuring the damages for pain and suffering on a mathematical formula
and presenting the same to the jury during closing argument on a poster or
blackboard.
896 So. (2d) 127 (Fla. 1957).
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plied that the use of the mathematical formula and placard by plain-
tiff's counsel was proper. However, Justice Ogilvie in his dissenting
opinion made the following statement: ". . . the verdict for the plain-
tiff was unconscionably excessive, that the verdict was not the product
of fair and unimpassioned reasoning of the jury; and same was par-
tially induced by the placard and final argument adding at least some
of the elements of damages more than once into the total requested
figure. "9
The landmark case used as the basis in reasoning for the majority of
jurisdictions which are not in favor of the mathematical formula is
Botta v. Brunner.10 In the Botta case, the plaintiff brought an action
for injuries sustained as a result of an auto accident. The jury rendered
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against one defendant and no cause
of action in favor of the other defendant, and the plaintiff appealed to
the Appellate Division." In his appeal the plaintiff urged that the
trial court erred in refusing to permit counsel to suggest to the jury
in closing argument a mathematical formula for the admeasurement of
damages for pain and suffering. The Appellate Division agreed with
plaintiff's viewpoint and a certification was granted by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey to review the decision of the Appellate Division.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the decision of the Ap-
pellate Division relative to the issue of whether or not it is proper to
use a mathematical formula. In so doing, they stated: "For hundreds
of years the measure of damages for pain and suffering following in
the wake of a personal injury has been 'fair and reasonable compen-
sation.' The general standard was adopted because of the universal
knowledge that a more specific or definite one is impossible. There is
and there can be no fixed basis, table, standard, or mathematical rule
which will serve as an accurate index and guide to the establishment
of damage awards for personal injuries. And it is equally plain that
there is no measure by which the amount of pain and suffering endured
by a particular human can be calculated. No market place exists at
which such malaise is bought and sold . . . there is no mart where
the price of a voluntary subjection of oneself to pain and suffering
is or can be fixed . . . the varieties and degrees of pain are almost in-
9 The placard used by Plaintiff's counsel is completely set out in the reported
dissenting opinion.
10 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N. J. 82, 138 A. (2d) 713 (1958).
11 Botta v. Brunner, 42 N. J. Super. 95, 126 A. (2d) 32 (1956).
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finite. Individuals differ greatly in susceptibility to pain and in capacity
to withstand it. And the impossibility of recognizing or of isolating fixed
levels or plateaus of suffering must be conceded."'12
At present there are more than eleven (11) jurisdictions agreeing
with the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.'3 Their primary
reasons for not allowing the presentation of a mathematical formula to
the jury are based on the language of the Botta case,14 and also because
those courts have adhered to the time immemorial standard, for measur-
ing damages for personal injuries, which is a just or reasonable com-
pensation. The administration of this criterion is entrusted to the im-
partial conscience and judgment of jurors.
There is one further point which should be mentioned. It appears
the basic underlying theory for not allowing the presentation of a math-
ematical formula to the jury is the result of a deep rooted fear that
the adoption of the mathematical formula would grant to the plaintiff
an unfair advantage over the defendant. The writer submits that those
jurisdictions opposed to the adoption of a mathematical formula for pain
and suffering clearly express the idea that the use of such a formula
would be nothing more than an attempt to acquire an emotional decision
from the jury rather than a well reasoned and factual determination.
Would Illinois follow those jurisdictions which are opposed to the
use of a mathematical formula? In the case of Graham v. Mattoon City
Ry. Co., counsel for the plaintiff asked for a specific lump sum amount
as he inferred and deduced that amount from the evidence in the case.
The Illinois Supreme Court approved the argument and stated: "We
do not think that there is any valid objection to counsel, in argument,
telling the jury what, under the evidence, counsel considers a fair com-
pensation for the injuries received.'" 15
12 For further discussion of the Botta case, id, see 60 A. L. R. (2d) 1331; 12
Rutgers L. Rev. 522 (1958) ; Colsey, "Evidence: Argumentation of Counsel," 4
Villanova L. Rev. 137 (1958); Graham, "Per Diem Measurement of Pain and
Suffering or Prejudicial Argument," 19 Ohio St. L. J. 780 (1958).
13 Sandoval v. Southern California Enterprises, 98 Cal. Sup. (2d) 240, 219 P.
(2d) 928 (1950); Gorczyca v. N. Y. N. H. and Hartford R. Co., 14-1 Conn. 701,
109 A. (2d) 589 (1954); Jackson v. LaFollette Hardware and Lumber Co., 101
F. Supp. 916 (E. D. Tenn. 1950), affirmed 193 F. (2d) 647 (6th Cir., 1951) ; St.
Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 114 Ark. 224, 169 S. W. 822 (1914);
Goodhart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 177 Pa. 1, 35 A. 191 (1896) ; Western and A. R.
R. v. Fowler, 77 Ga. App. 206, 47 S. E. (2d) 874 (1948) ; National Fruit Product
Co. v. Wagner, 185 Va. 38, 37 S. E. (2d) 757 (1946) ; Parr v. Douglas. 253 Wis.
311, 34 N. W. (2d) 229 (1948); Denco Bus Co. v. Keller, 202 Oki. 263, 212 P.
(2d) 469 (1949); Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co. v. Candler, 283 F. 881 (8th Cir.
1922).
14 See case cited in note 10, ante.
15 See case cited in note 6, ante.
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Illinois has consistently followed the approach that an attorney is
entitled to a wide latitude in his closing argument.16  As stated in the
principal case of Goldstein v. Fendelman, where one of the issues in-
volved in the case was the damages suffered by the plaintiff, counsel for
the plaintiff should be permitted to explain and argue those elements
which comprise the total amount sought. Inasmuch as the Illinois Su-
preme Court allows counsel for the plaintiff to suggest a lump sum
as a suggestion of damages, it seems only fair to assume that he should
also be allowed to further analyze and logically suggest the means by
which he arrived at the lump sum amount of damages.
If the Illinois Supreme Court were to so hold, it would not be
alone in adopting the mathematical formula technique. There are at
least twelve (12) jurisdictions which presently allow the use of a math-
ematical formula or its equivalent.1 7  Even New Jersey, the jurisdiction
which is looked to as the landmark for those opposing the use of the
mathematical formula techniques, has recently restricted the applicability
of the theory it adopted in the case of Botta v. Brunner.5  In Mathews
v. Nelso?' 9 it was held that the reasoning of the Botta case is not appli-
cable to the closing argument of a wrongful death action.
It would be grossly inconsistent to deny counsel for the plaintiff
the right to analyze and specify certain amounts to be used in com-
puting the amount of damages sought as recovery in view of the fact
that the Illinois legislature has expressly granted the courts permission
to allow the jury to carry from the bar papers read or received in evi-
dence.20 However, the fear of being inconsistent should not be the pri-
mary reason for allowing plaintiff's counsel to use a mathematical formula.
As previously stated, the basic reason for not allowing the math-
ematical formula is a fear that the jury will not be able to render a
well reasoned and factual verdict. This fear is not well founded. The
16 Nusbaum v. Penn. R. R. Co., 340 Ill. App. 131, 90 N. E. (2d) 921 (1950).
17 Continental Bus System Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S. W. (2d) 153 (Tex. 1959);
Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 299 Ky. 706, 183 S. W. (2d) 637 (1944) ; Arnold v. Ellis,
231 Miss. 757, 97 So. (2d) 744 (1957) : Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630. 93 So.
(2d) 138 (1956) ; Freeman v. Manhattan Cab. Corp., 1 Misc. (2d) 601, 150 N. Y. S.
(2d) 717 (1950) ; Johnson v. Brown, 345 P. (2d) 754 (Nev. 1959); Jones v.
Hogan, 351 P. (2d) 153 (Wash. 1960) ; Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App. 261, 130
N. E. (2d) 491 (1955) (per diem argument sanctioned but blackboard use and
view by jury restricted to period of argument only) ; Petition of Gulf Oil Corp.,
172 F. Supp. 911 S. D. N. Y. (1959) ; Bowers v. Pennsylvania R. R., 182 F. Supp.
756 (D. C. Del. 1960).
18 See case cited in note 10, ante.
19 57 N. J. Super. 515, 155 A. (2d) 111 (1959).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110 § 67 (4) ; Papers read or received in
evidence, other than depositions, may be carried from the bar by the jury.
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jury should be guided by reasonable and practical considerations, but
they should not be required to determine the issue of damages in the
abstract which is exactly the burden placed upon them by those juris-
dictions adopting the standard of reasonable compensation rather than
the mathematical formula. The contention that the use of a mathematical
formula presents a danger in that it may be mistaken for evidence is
not valid and nothing more than an exaggeration. Such danger, if at
all present, can also be easily dispelled by the court's proper instruc-
tion. In the trial of any case, whether it be civil or criminal, the court
is always faced with the problem of properly instructing the jury to
prohibit the jury from taking into consideration facts or speculations
which are not in evidence.
The scales of justice are not in danger of being improperly bal-
anced. If counsel for the plaintiff uses a mathematical formula during
his closing argument in an attempt to justify the amount of recovery
sought, the opposing counsel is equally free to suggest his own amounts
as inferred by him from the evidence relating to the condition for which
the damages are sought. The absence of a fixed standard for the mone-
tary admeasurement of damages for pain and suffering is the very
reason why counsel for both parties should be allowed the use of a
mathematical formula.
HUSBAND AND WIFF--ATIONS-WHETHER Loss OF CONSORTIUM MAY
BE ASSERTED BY WIFE op NEGLIGENTLY INJURED HUSBAND-A significant
development in the realm of damages founded upon the common-law
concept of loss of consortium has appeared in the recent decision of
Dini v. Naiditch.1 For the first time in Illinois it was decided that the
wife of a negligently injured husband was entitled to a right of ac-
tion for loss of consortium. The question on the allowance of damages
to the wife for loss of consortium arose in the aforementioned case in the
Superior Court of Cook County joined with another cause of action by
the husband for negligent injury. Plaintiff's husband was a fireman
for the City of Chicago. He was injured while fighting a fire in the
defendants' premises. The Superior Court dismissed both causes of
action and entered judgments for the defendants notwithstanding ver-
dicts in favor of the plaintiffs, on the ground that there was no legal
basis for liability. Upon direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court
the decisions as to both causes of action were reversed and remanded.
After deciding the degree of due care required by landowners in main-
1 20 Ill. (2d) 406, 170 N. E. (2d) 881 (1960). Schaefer, C. J. and Klingbiel, J.
filed dissenting opinions concurred in by House, J.
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taining their property free from the hazards which might contribute to
the injury of firemen upon the premises in the performance of their
duties, the court also dealt favorably with the allowance of damages
claimed by the wife of the injured fireman based upon the common-law
rule restricting recovery to the husband for loss of consortium due to
the negligent injury of his wife. The Illinois Supreme Court held, how-
ever, that the claim for loss of consortium should be a reciprocal cause
of action capable of being asserted by either husband or wife upon the
negligent injury of the other.
The question concerning a wife's right of action for loss of consortium
due to the negligent injury of the husband was first heard in Illinois
in Patelski v. Snyder.2  By application of the Act of 18743 which gave
married women the right to sue and be sued without joining their hus-
bands, it was argued that married women by virtue of this statute ac-
quired the right to a cause of action for loss of consortium. This argu-
ment was refuted by the court saying, ". . . the law of 1874, while
extending the legal independence of a married woman as to all legal
proceedings and in many particulars increasing her responsibilities and
diminishing those of her husband did not undertake, as we read it, to
give her any more control of her husband's property, earnings or other
choses in action than she had before. Nor did it create in her a right
of action for personal injuries to him which did not before exist. '"4 The
U. S. Court of Appeals 7th Circuit, in 1954r, when facing the same issue
in a diversity case, bound itself to the Appellate decision since there
had been no indication that the higher court of the state would rule
otherwise.
What is Consortium? How and why did the doctrine emerge?
The court in the present case under scrutiny defined the term "con-
sortium" as including, ". . . in addition to material services, ele-
ments of companionship, felicity and sexual intercourse, all welded into
a conceptualistic unity"6 (emphasis supplied). The court, however, pierced
the "unity" concept which is strictly adhered to in England.7 In de-
nying recovery, an English Court interpreted "consortium" as being an
indivisible concept incapable of being dissected for purposes of recovery
for loss of any specific element or elements, short of total loss. In
2179 Ill. App. 24 (1913).
3 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1959, Ch. 68 § 1.
4 179 Ill. App. 24 at 28 (1913).
5 Seymour v. Union News Co., 217 F. (2d) 168 (1954).
620 Ill. (2d) 406 at 427, 170 N. E. (2d) 881 at 891 (1960).
7 Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., 2 K. B. 639 (1951).
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the leading American case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.8 the gist of the
action was for the loss of sexual relations. The tendency in American
jurisdictions has been to treat "consortium" as a divisible unity, en-
titling the litigant to recover for what under the strict English rule
would be considered a partial loss of consortium.9
Since historical background seems to constitute a major reason for
denying to the wife a cause of action for loss of her husband's con-
sortium, this phase of the problem should be fully covered. The Illinois
court did precisely this, extending their discussion to the origin of the
common-law rule. The concept of "consortium" grew out of a propri-
etary interest which husbands had in their wives based upon the idea
that the wife was her husband's servant, and any interference with the
service of a servant constituted an actionable trespass upon that property
right. This right of action, however, was carefully restricted to the
husband since it was only intended to be vested in the husband, and
a reciprocal exercise of the same action by the wife could not be effec-
tively employed because of the common-law rule making a married woman
incapable of suing, except when joined by her husband.'0
Upon the foregoing foundation, the courts built an impressive wall
of precedent. So deeply was this common-law rule imbedded in his-
torical precedent that even subsequent to the removal of a married
woman's disability to sue, the courts remained entrenched in the firm
belief that no extension of a husband's cause of action could attach to
the wife.'1 This steady flow of cases continued unchanged until 1950
with the exception of a North Carolina decision, 12 which was subse-
887 U. S. App. D. C. 57, 183 F. (2d) 811, 23 A. L. RI. (2d) 1366 (1950).
9Ibid; See also Montgomery v. Stephen, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N. W. (2d) 227
(1960).
10 Holbrook, "The Change in the Meaning of Consortium," 22 Mich. L. Rev. 1
(1923) ; Holdsworth, A History of English Law (3rd ed. 1923), Vol. 3, pp. 520-33.
11Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P. (2d) 1100
(1937); Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631, 40 L. R. A., N. S. 963
(1912) ; Commercial Carriers v. Small, 277 Ky. 189, 126 S. W. (2d) 143 (1939);
Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 A. 538, 5 A. L. R. 1045 (1918); Feneff v.
New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436, 24 L. R. A., N. S.
1024 (1909); Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N. W. 154 (1935);
Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S. W. 462, 13 A. L. R. 1320 (1918); Stout
v. Kansas City Terminal R. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S. W. 1019 (1913); Tobias-
sen v. Polley, 96 N. J. L. 66, 114 A. 153 (1921); Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App.
Div. 769, 270 N. Y. S. 534 (1934) ; Maloy v. Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N. Y. S. (2d)
608 (1938); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. (2d) 611
(1945); Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204 (1915).
L. R. A. 1916 E, 700, Ann. Cas. 1918 D, 206; Howard v. Verdigris Valley Electric
Co-op, 201 Okla. 504, 207 P. (2d) 784 (1949); Sheard v. Oregon Electric R. Co.,
137 Ore. 341, 2 P. (2d) 916 (1931); Dupe v. Hunsberger, 58 D. & C. (Pa.)
483 (1946), 50 Lanc. Rev. 267, 62 Montg. 315.
12 Hipp v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318, 18
A. L. R. 873 (1921).
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quently overruled, 3 and a Georgia decision,14 in which the court was
evenly divided. In both decisions, arguments denying a wife's right
to a cause of action for loss of consortium due to the negligent injury
of her husband were disputed and renounced. Here, then, was formed
the beginning of opposition to the existing majority rule, and included
a reflection of thinking by legal writers who branded the rule as being
void of logic in view of existing Married Women's Acts, the intent of
which was to provide legal equality between spouses. 15 Aside from the
equality argument aimed at destroying the historical confines for scope
of liability, other reasons upholding the majority rule were slashed at
by revealing the complete inconsistency which has resulted in denying
a reciprocal action to both spouses. 16
In 1950 the V. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.' 7 made a complete departure from the ma-
jority rule and extended the husband's cause of action to the wife also.
The court made an extensive review of prior litigation and other au-
thorities disallowing a wife the reciprocal right to a cause of action for
loss of consortium where the husband's injury resulted from a third
party's negligence. The majority of the Illinois Supreme Court in Dini
v. Naiditeh5 concurred in this decision to depart from historical precedent
compiled almost entirely without deviation until 1950.
Even though the Hitaffer ease was well reasoned and very thorough
in its coverage, subsequent decisions in most states still clung doggedly
to the ancient common-law rule. Courts still refusing to alter their posi-
tion set forth different lines of argument to sustain their position.
A popular approach to the problem rested in the avoidance of it.
Some courts explained their position by concluding that the legislature
must first clarify the rights of husband and wife as to actions for loss
of consortium. 19 Other courts of a lower judicial stature were reluctant
18 Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307, 37 A. L. R.
889 (1925), with two dissenting opinions.
14 McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 491, 56 S. E. (2d) 299 (1949).
15 Holbrook, op. cit.
16 Kinnaird, J. M., "Loss of Consortium," 35 Ky. L. Rev. 220, 223 (1947)
Prosser, Torts (West Publishing Co., 1941) p. 948.
'787 U. S. App. D. C. 57, 183 F. (2d) 811, 23 A. L. R. (2d) 1366 (1950).
18 20 Ill. (2d) 406, 170 N. E. (2d) 881 (1960).
19 Smith v. United Construction Workers, 122 So. (2d) 153 (Ala. 1960)
Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 50 Cal. (2d) 664, 328 P. (2d)
449 (1958) ; Johnson v. Enslow, 132 Colo. 101, 286 P. (2d) 630 (1955) ; Ripley v.
Ewell, 61 So. (2d) 420 (Fla. 1952); Snodgrass v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 164 A.
(2d) 579 (N. H. 1960) ; Tennebruso v. Cunningham, 115 N. Y. S. (2d) 322 (1952);
Nelson v. A. M. Lockett & Co., 206 Okla. 334, 243 P. (2d) 719 (1952) ; Garrett v.
Reno Oil Co., 271 S. W. (2d) 764 (Tex. 1954); Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casu-
alty Co., 269 Wisc. 647, 70 N. W. (2d) 205 (1955).
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to depart from existing rules and passed responsibility for an initial de-
cision to a higher court in the State.20  Still another method used by
courts in side-stepping the necessity of reaffirming the existing law by
sound logic and valid legal reasoning was to yield to precedent. 21 In
some instances, expressions by majority judges indicated that they did
not wholeheartedly support the once unanimous denial of the wife's right
to a remedy for the loss of her husband's consortium.2 2  In other cases,
vehement dissents reflected a breach appearing in the once solid wall of
precedent. 23  Federal courts sitting in various states still adhering to
the old rule were bound to the state precedent despite their own con-
trary opinions in the light of the Hitaffer decision. 24
In attempting to meet the challenge which the Hitaffer decision posed
to judicial precedent, numerous other explanations were attempted to
put decisions denying a wife's recovery upon a sounder legal basis. One
of these pointed to the danger of double recovery. 25  It was contended
that since the husband could also bring an action for damages resulting
from his inability to earn a living due to his injuries, a wife's recovery
for loss of consortium, also alleging such loss would result in dual re-
covery. Therefore, in order to avoid this, actions by the wife were
restricted to direct and intentional injuries inflicted upon the wife, for
which no suit for damages could be brought by the husband (intentional
interference with the consortium, alienation of affections, criminal con-
versation, sale of incapacitating drugs, etc.).26 This dilemma had been
approached in the Hitaffer decision by suggesting that damages for loss
of support recovered in the husband's suit be offset against the wife's
recovery in her suit for loss of consortium. 27 Chief Justice Schaefer in
his dissenting opinion to the Naiditch case decried the inconsistency with
20 Larocca v. American Chain & Cable Co., 23 N. J. Super. 195, 92 A. (2d)
811 (1952); Cook v. Snyder, 119 N. Y. S. (2d) 481 (1953).
21 Jeune v. Del E. Webb Const. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P. (2d) 723 (1954);
LaEace v. Cincinnati N. & C. Ry. Co., 249 S. W. (2d) 534 (Ky. 1952) ; Larocca v.
American Chain & Cable Co., 23 N. J. Super. 195, 92 A. (2d) 811 (1952) ; see also
note in 17 Ohio St. L. J. 153 (1956).
22 Smith v. United Construction Workers, 122 So. -(2d) 153 (Ala. 1960) ; Burk
v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 109 N. E. (2d) 407 (1952).
23 Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 50 Cal. (2d) 664, 328 P.
(2d) 449 (1958) ; Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A. (2d) 662 (1960).
24 Seymour v. Union News Co., 217 F. (2d) 168 (1954); Filice v. U. S., 217
F. (2d) 515 (Cal. 1954); Josewski v. Midland Constructors, Inc., 117 F. Supp.
681 (S. D. 1953) ; Werthan Bag Corp., 202 F. (2d) 119 (Tenn. 1953).
25 Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A. (2d) 82 (1955):
Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wise. 647, 70 N. W. (2d) 205 (1955).
26 Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 50 Cal. (2d) 664, 328 P.
(2d) 449 (1958) ; Lurie v. Mammoni, 200 ,Misc. 320, 107 N. Y. S. (2d) 182 (1951) ;
Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wise. 647, 70 N. W. (2d) 205 (1955).
27 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87 U. S. App. D. C. 57, 183 F. (2d) 811 at 815,
23 A. L. R. (2d) 1366 (1950).
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which the majority applied the meaning of consortium, first separating
the material service element for elimination against the husband's re-
covery and then criticizing a division of the consortium concept. He
suggested that when looking at the problem of a double recovery realis-
tically, the only practical solution would be a ". . . compulsory joinder
of the two causes of action . . .28 No matter how impeding the prob-
lem of "double recovery" may be, the proponents of such an argument
fail to answer a question posed by legal writers, which is, why hadn't
the problem of double recovery been anticipated with regard to a hus-
band's suit for loss of consortium in relation with the wife's suit for
negligent injury?29
Another line of opposition has examined the effect which modern
times and Married Women's Acts have had upon the original common-
law remedy of the husband for loss of consortium and consider the
remedy as it once existed, dead, and not expanded in its scope.30 This, of
course, would be the path of least resistance to the advocates of denying
the remedy to the wife, and perhaps just as logical as a proposed extension
of the remedy to the wife.31
If the wife is allowed to maintain her own action by extending
the remedy once restricted to the husband, how far will this extension
be permitted to reach? This question was posed by Chief Justice Schaefer
in his dissenting opinion.32  Perhaps to give validity to such an action
by the wife would open the door to claims under the same theory by
children, dependent members of households and possibly even business
partners.33 This argument, however, loses some of its force when the
term "consortium" examined for definition, discloses that the term re-
stricts itself to the conjugal fellowship of husband and wife.
34
In England, a revealing decision 35 was rendered which contained
a discussion of factors heretofore shoved into the background by Ameri-
can decisions. Although denying the wife the right to sue for loss of
her husband's consortium, some members of the court made very pene-
28 Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. (2a) 406 at 435, 170 N. E. (2d) 881 at 895 (1960).
29 Kinnaird, op. cit.; 26 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 205 (1951).
30 Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N. Y. (2d) 524, 176 N. Y. S. (2d) 354
(1958) ; Mlynck v. Yarnall, 19 Pa. Dist. (2d) 333 (1959).
3126 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 205 (1951).
32 Dini v. Naiditch, 20 IMI. (2d) 406 at 4-33, 170 N. E. (2d) 881 at 894 (1960).
33 Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 50 Cal. (2d) 664, 328 P.
(2d) 449 (1958) ; Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A. (2d) 662 (1960).
34 Black's Law Dictionary (West Publishing Co., 1951), Fourth Edition, p.
382; Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 50 Cal. (2d) 664, 328 P.
(2d) 449 (1958).
35 Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., 2 K. B. 639 (1951).
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trating observations of the problem. Lord Justice Asquith and Lord Jus-
tice Birkett agreed that consortium was an indivisible concept, consisting
of companionship, love, affection and comfort, mutual service and sexual
intercourse. These were considered as being welded into one inseparable
unity. This definition was also accepted in the Naiditch case but applied
only partially. The English Court, however, maintained a strict ad-
herence to this definition, denying a recovery by the wife because she
had not suffered a concurrent loss of every constituent part of con-
sortium. Lord Justice Asquith concluded that the problem should be
solved by the Legislature by either one of two alternative solutions,
either by abolishing the husband's cause of action or by retaining it
and conferring a similar cause of action on the wife. Lord Justice
Birkett amplified the intimated approval of a cause of action in the
wife as being in conformity with present day legal equality of hus-
band and wife. He disapproved of the Hitaffer decision, but only on
the point of there having been a partial impairment of consortium
(sexual relations). Lord Justice Cohen agreed with Lord Justice Birkett
on the principle of total impairment of consortium as a requisite to
recovery, but felt that, lacking a malicious and willful act on the part
of the defendant, even proof of total loss of consortium would not enable
the wife to succeed.
The requirement of an intentional act still adhered to in England
has, however, noticeably faded from the American armory of arguments
attempting to deny the wife recovery and therefore, was rather sum-
marily dismissed in the Naiditch decision.36  This argument has been
soundly denounced as inconsistent with the right of action existing in
the husband, where no such distinction is made, and where the injury
sustained is the same under either circumstances.
37
Another ground for denying the wife an action for loss of consortium
was founded upon remoteness of the injury. This contention was ex-
tremely popular among courts38 prior to the Hitaffer decision. Its ex-
istence as a principal ground for denying relief has given ground as of
late to such reasons as, the need for legislation, double recovery, abolish-
36 Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. (2d) 406 at 430, 170 N. E. (2d) 881 at 893 (1960).
37 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co, 87 U. S. App. D. C. 57, 183 F. (2d) 811, 23 A. L. R.
(2d) 1366 (1950); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N. W. (2d) 480 (1956);
Kinnaird, op. cit.; Prosser, op. cit., p. 946.
38 Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P. (2d) 1100
(1937); Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631, 40 L. R. A., N. S. 236
(1912); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 A. 538, 5 A. L. R. 1045 (1918);
Feneff v. New York Central & N. R. R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436, 24 L. R. A.,
N. S. 1024 (1909) ; Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307,
37 A. L. R. 889 (1925).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ment of husband's recovery and possible extention of recovery to per-
sons outside the marital relation. Principally responsible for this decline
in persuasiveness have been arguments which point to the liability of
a wrongdoer for acts of negligence despite the foreseeability of the ulti-
mate result, and the fact that, if such a rule were accepted, there would
no longer exist a basis for distinguishing between an action by a hus-
band and one by the wife since in both cases, the damages for the senti-
mental elements of consortium would be too remote and consequential.
39
Some recent decisions have also looked to the effect which an adop-
tion of a reciprocal action for loss of consortium would have upon the
status of litigation. The main concern centered about claims which
had already been settled based upon prior precedent and still within
the statute of limitations. These claims would be vulnerable to a re-
opening if such a right of action in the wife was conceded to by the
courts. 40 This reason may have some merit when looking at the problem
from a practical viewpoint, but provides no real legal justification for
a denial of the right of action in the wife.
Despite courageous attempts by courts to retain the common-law rule
relating to an action for loss of consortium as it existed long before the
appearance of Married Women's Acts, the sands of time coupled with
the incessant surge of changing conditions appear to be the irresistible
forces contributing to the slow destruction of the old rule.
With the decision of Dini v. Naiditch41 Illinois has joined Arkansas,
Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Nebraska and South Dakota as states whose re-
viewing courts have chosen to follow the Hitaffer decision. 42 This change
in direction by the Illinois Supreme Court constitutes a gigantic forward
stride in abolishing legal inconsistencies and fictions which have far out-
lived their utility.
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